, published in 1996, ended a lengthy discussion of the Parliamentary inquiry with the comment: "the Royal Commission on Opium was not an impartial body seeking to learn the truth about the Opium Commission. The
Commission's report defended the status quo and left the anti-opium advocates with the unfinished task of stopping the opium trade." 10 In 1998, Jasper Woodcock concluded that "the restricted terms of reference" for the Commission permitted it to evade entirely the question of opium smoking in China, which was "the main concern of the anti-opium movement".
11
To a certain extent these criticisms are accurate. The Government of India was an extraordinarily conservative institution in the late nineteenth century that resisted change. Badly shaken by the Revolt of 1857, the Government feared civil unrest if it engaged in any radical social legislation or social change. Whether this was well founded apprehension or paranoia is open to debate, but official resistance to intrusive measures was palpable.
12
The Government of India did its best to influence the outcome of the inquiry. 13 The China, 1874 China, -1917 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1996) . p. 108.
11 Jasper Woodcock, "Commissions (Royal and other) on drug misuse: who needs them?,"
Addiction 90 (1995): 1297-1308.p. 1299. 12 Typical of these sentiments is this passage from James Lyall's diary for November 9, 1893. "Sir C. Crosthwaite came in morning: had a good talk with him about affairs; he thinks there is a dangerous growth of antipathy to our Raj brought about partly by our over governing and innovating procedures and Viceroy and his Council, and a group of active and retired hig h Indian officials coordinated the official response to what they perceived as a major threat to the financial and political security of India. James Lyall, a recently retired high-ranking Indian officer who served on the Commission, forcefully and persuasively managed the Government's campaign from within. Simultaneously, however, the two anti-opium members of the Commission were equally intent on shaping the Commission's findings-an effort led by Henry Wilson, a prominent reform Member of Parliament. As with any similar official inquiry into a long-debated and highly charged issue like the opium trade, the Royal Commission on Opium was the venue for a political struggle -a conflict that the Government of India won.
To assume, however, that the Government of India somehow deceived the members of the Commission by a Potemkin village façade is also erroneous. This view does not do justice to the work of the Commission. The Royal Commission on opium was not a whitewash. Instead, Commission members faithfully followed their Parliamentary instructions, reported accurately and drew reasonable conclusions from their witnesses and evidence. Undoubtedly, if witnesses who were serving members of the Indian Civil Service were to express outright anti-opium positions they might suffer from the disapproval of their colleague and superiors. However, most
Indian officials appear to have entertained few doubts about opium and needed no prompting in their testimony.
The Government had little trouble in recruiting and encouraging private, unofficial witnesses to support its case. Opinion in the Indian-owned English language and Indian language press strongly opposed prohibition. For example, the Madras Hindu in its issue of May 11, 1895
commented: "Opium may be a great evil, but national bankruptcy is a greater evil".
14 Significantly, a majority of the leaders of the fledgling Indian National Congress, while uneasy with the moral aspect of the opium trade, adopted a position virtually identical to that of the Government of India. 15 They disapproved of the anti-opium agitation occurring in England and, although they did not use the term itself, saw the reform campaign as a form of cultural imperialism. The Congress leaders concluded that India's interests as a putative nation-state were not served by abolishing the opium trade.
at Los Angeles, 1978) . Cited. for Lord Lansdowne's attempts to respond to the criticisms of opium reformers and the appointment of the Royal Commission.
14 Quoted in Chandra, p. 567. n. 278. 15 Bipan Chandra, The rise and growth of economic nationalism in India; economic policies of Indian national leadership, 1880 -1905 (New Delhi,: People's Pub. House, 1966 The Royal Commission's final conclusions closely resembled the position of the Government of India, but this was not the result of manipulation. Agreement stemmed more from the reasonableness and merit of the Indian Government's policies and its practices. The
Commission and the Indian Government were more protective of India's economic interests and more sensitive to Indian public opinion than the anti-opium reformers. In their zeal to attack the iniquitie s of the opium traffic and the British imperial interests that supported and profited from it, the reformers sensationalized the presumed harm done to Indian consumers of opium and minimized the costs to India of ending the traffic. They ignored Indian sensitivities by denying any cultural and social value to the use of opium. The opium reformers were blinded by strongly ethnocentric biases-more so than those British officials, physicians, and others who actually lived in India.
This argument is best supported by a closer study of the Royal Commission on Opium than has previously been the case. If we look carefully at the Parliamentary debates and resolutions that established the Commission, at the members appointed, at its procedures and hearings, and at the testimony and documents it considered, the Royal Commission appears in a far better light than that cast by its critics. In particular, the Commission considered two key issues: first, that of the actual consumption and use of opium-for medicinal and for moodaltering purposes--within Indian society and second, the means by which the Government of India regulated both the production and consumption of opium.
Much, although not all, the necessary data can be drawn directly from the 2,500 pages printed in the seven volumes offered to the British Parliament. In addition to over 28,000 oftenlengthy questions and witness responses printed verbatim from shorthand transcriptions, the report contains numerous notes and memoranda prepared especially for the hearings. Members of the Commission also wrote extended notes on various aspects of the opium issue. Perhaps put off by the notion that the evidence was somehow biased, historians have largely ignored the massive documentation produced by the Commission's hearings. The printed report is one of the most valuable sources we possess for studying all aspects of opium in India in the latter decades of the nineteenth century.
Parliamentary Victory
Throughout the nineteenth century evangelicals and Quakers were disturbed by the moral implications of Indian opium. They were unhappy about forcing the Qing Emperors to accept a product that they regarded as harmful to their people. They saw opium as an obstacle to the work Opium and the British Indian Empire Web Page The four-hour debate that followed touched on every issue and argument raised in the half-century long campaign to end sales of Indian opium to China. Against opium, the reformers pleaded Christian ethics. In rebuttal opium apologists pointed to the financial interests of India and equated consumption of opium in the Orient to that of alcohol in the West.
In his speech, Pease eloquently argued the anti-opium case. Britain made the laws and appointed the Government of India. Therefore, Britain had "for the sake of pecuniary gain, fostered, promoted and encouraged the growth of the poppy and the sale of the poppy" in a "traffic which is a disgrace to our Christianity and our morality". Opium was a useful medication but should be treated in India, as it was in Britain, as a poison subject to harmful abuse. He recited the lengthy list of anti-opium memorials and petitions that he had received from church convocations in Britain, and Chinese Christians in Hong Kong, Singapore, Canton and Peking.
He read testimonials from missionaries in China that graphically described the grievous effects of opium smoking on the Chinese. Pease went to cite examples from the recent experiences of "China, Java, Burmah, California and our own colonies in Australia of the evil that is done by this drug in which we traffic."
As for India, he quoted their own statements to show that Government of India officials completely ignored moral questions and were only concerned with opium as a source of revenue.
Pease argued that the peasants in India did not fare well by growing opium instead of food crops and that this left them vulnerable to famine. He pointed out the precariousness of opium as a revenue source subject to the Chinese market; to the fact that the opium revenues were overstated and probably did not net more than 3.5 million pounds sterling per year; and that the Indian army consumed far too much of the Government's revenues. He ended his speech by appealing to Britain as a Christian country and its "beautiful ideal-that as a nation we acknowledge a of India and China because it was "morally justifiable". If it were not, he would say end the system whatever the cost and forget about finances. The present system within India "is just as defensible as the Excise system of England, or of any civilized country in Europe". He pointed out that most of the opium consumed in China was grown domestically by producers who were continually increasing quantity and improving its quality thus driving the more expensive Indian opium from the market. China was free to set its own policies: "…if China is poisoned by opium, she poisons herself". Moreover, "opium is not deleterious in reasonable moderation, and is…far less deleterious than alcoholic drink". He denied that the Chinese were a degraded race drugged by opium. Instead they were a temperate and productive race of whom only a minority actually consumed opium. In India "the most stalwart and enduring races" took opium with no ill effects.
That the Government of India drew tax revenue from opium was proper: "If it be righteous to draw taxes from a gin-palace, it is equally righteous to do the same thing from an opium den. There is no wrong morally in taxing a spirit or in taxing a drug. Either is harmless when used in moderation….Either…is dangerous only when used to excess, though the drug is less dangerous than the spirit." Temple strongly defended the Bengal monopoly system with its tight controls over poppy growers and heavy excise taxes on domestic consumption. If opium were prohibited in British India and the native states already producing opium under the Malwa system were prevented from shipping their opium from Bombay, "all along the whole course of our frontier there would be a vast increase in the illicit traffic in opium and in the consumption of that article by our people [in British India] ."
At the division, the House accepted the substitute motion by a vote of 160 to 130. This left the main motion ready for a vote. However, Robert Fowler rose to offer an amendment: "And this House, feeling the pressure of taxation on the people of India, will take steps to reimburse the deficiency so caused by the Indian Government." Debate had just begun on the amendment when, at one o'clock in the morning, the Speaker adjourned without a vote due to the lateness of the hour. Although the substantive vote was never taken, the anti-opiumists proclaimed the vote actually taken as an affirmation of their stand. They put renewed pressure on the Indian government, but did not see any sweeping change in policy. Opium and the British Indian Empire Web Page investigating with the utmost thoroughness, sparing no labour to arrive at the truth, and shrinking from no conclusion that facts enforce. On this Opium question I believe he has never expressed any opinion, and may, therefore, be regarded as certain to be untrammeled. He will command the entire confidence of the medical profession…".
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The Secretary of State for India asked the Viceroy to nominate two Indians to serve on the Opium Commission. In turn the Viceroy sent out a request to his provincial governors for names. Determining whom to nominate was a delicate matter for Lansdowne, since this was purely voluntary service asked of private persons and one that presented ample opportunity for withering criticism from the anti-opium forces. As MacDonnell, the acting Lieutenant Governor 
Hearings and Debates
The Government of India seconded one of its civilian officers to act as secretary to the Royal Commission-an arrangement that later occasioned some criticism from the antiopiumists. The Commission relied upon the Indian administration to arrange and facilitate its tour in India and to recruit and make available several categories of witnesses. These included officials who could testify as to the financial and administrative details of opium; "selected officials, both civil and military, with experience regarding the consumption of opium by different races and in different parts of India"; police officials with experience of the criminal law Alexander also made effective use of the network of committed anti-opium missionaries working in India, and received assistance from members of the Brahmo Samaj and temperance societies.
They did produce a large number of witnesses who gave testimony. The Commission claimed that it heard every anti-opium witness nominated by the Society and turned no one away.
Generally, the Commission followed a well-established British procedure for publicly sitting and examining witnesses. After selection, but before appearing, the Commission asked each witness to write an abstract summarizing the nature of the evidence that he or she was planning to give. When, pressed for time, the Commission pruned the list of witnesses, it retained the abstracts submitted and published these in its report. After making an opening statement, members of the Commission were free to pursue any line of questioning they wished subject only to constraints of time, or occasionally, an intervention from the Chairman. At times, members subjected witnesses to vigorous questioning. The witnesses apparently did not testify under oath, but were certainly expected to be truthful. Two shorthand writers recorded the questions put and the replies of each witness-exhaustively reproduced in the final report. Most witnesses were conversant in English, but a minority was not. These, with the help of interpreters, gave their evidence in whichever Indian language they were fluent.
This was a hard-working body. The Commission held public hearings 70 of its 83 days in India; examined 723 witnesses "of whom 466 were natives of India or China, and 257
Europeans"; and accepted written statements from numerous other witnesses whose testimony could not be taken in person. 46 With only a few exceptions the Indian witnesses were elite members of Indian society drawn from higher status and wealthier groups and professions. British witnesses, official and non-official, had, by definition, similar status and power. As it stated, the The entries in James Lyall's private diary, kept daily during his service with the Opium Commission, reveal how assiduously he applied himself to the task of shaping the final outcome.
Returning to India fresh from retirement the previous year, Lyall socialized and consulted with his former colleagues, the provincial governors and highest-ranking members of the Government administrative changes in the system could be made but the Commission affirmed the "Bengal monopoly as the best system for regulating the production of opium in British India."
Consumption of opium by the people of India does not cause "extensive moral or physical degradation" and disentangling medical from non-medical consumption is not "practicable". Opium smoking, however, "is little practised in India; it is considered a disreputable habit". And finally, Indian public opinion rejected prohibition: "The testimony laid before us has been unanimous that the people of India would be unwilling to bear the cost of prohibitive measures."
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Consumption in India
Should production and use of opium in India be limited to medical purposes? British,
American and Canadian missionaries from Protestant denominations living and working in India
were the strongest advocates for complete prohibition to appear before the Commission. For decades, their outspoken dislike of opium and the policies of the Government of India had fueled anti-opium protests in Britain.
Typical were the views of Bishop Thoburn, who spoke for eighty missionaries sent to India from the United States by the Methodist Episcopal Church. He testified that opium was "a very great evil" and should be prohibited. He and his church were strongly against stimulants of all kinds. His missionaries did not permit Indian opium users to join their churches and if any members took up opium they came under discipline. The use of opium was "inconsistent with a correct Christian life" and led to vice and immorality. Consuming opium "takes the moral stamina right out of a man". At least half of all opium users took it in excess with ruinous effects on their health, their morals and their finances. The Bishop conceded that coolies and other laborers sometimes used opium to work harder and reduce hunger pangs, but argued that the drug also enabled them to destroy their health by overwork. He thought the medical uses of opium were exaggerated. Opium was not a "medical necessity" for rural people. The licensing system imposed by the Government of India by making opium available for public sale, invariably increased consumption. Indians generally disapproved of opium use. Indian opinion was overwhelmingly in favor of prohibition despite the financial costs. However, Bishop Thoburn's evidence and that of other anti-opium witnesses faltered before the weight of pro-opium testimony in two key areas. First, witness after witness testified that opium use in India was not harmful to either the individual or society-far less than that of alcohol. Secondly official witnesses had little trouble showing that the Government of India tightly regulated and discouraged domestic consumption of opium-despite its fiscal interest in higher sales of excise opium. These two issues are addressed in the remainder of the article.
To support its general conclusion that opium was not harmful in the Indian context, the Commission relied heavily upon an analysis of the evidence carried out by Sir William Roberts.
His medical reputation for objectivity and accuracy won credibility for the final report and its conclusions. Brassey placed Roberts' memorandum as the first appendix to the final report. In this lengthy document Roberts reviewed the "large mass of new and interesting information, gathered by the Opium Commission during their tour in India, on the general features and the medical aspects of the opium habit in that country."
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Roberts began by observing that all human societies (with the possible exception of the most primitive), consumed mood-altering drugs or, in his terms "articles of a stimulating and restorative character". Drugs such as alcohol, opium, tea, coca, tobacco, and hemp seemed to meet a "profound instinct of human nature" as they acted to produce "an enhanced sense of wellbeing or "euphoria". 61 Such drugs were not normally taken as foods for their nutritive value, nor were they absolutely essential because many individuals or group abstain completely from any such substances. He thereby made an implicit claim that opium must be vie wed as equivalent to other similar drugs consumed around the world and that its effects were similar.
Roberts first addressed the non-medical use of opium, or the "opium habit" in India, which was distributed widely, but irregularly throughout the subcontinent. The heaviest usage was in the northern and western regions of the subcontinent with much lower levels in the extreme south. By its nature, opium consumption in India was unobtrusive, both in its mode of ingestion by eating small pills and in the relative lack of outward symptoms among users of 61 In a footnote Roberts commented, "Euphoria is an old medical term, signifying "feeling perfectly well and able to bear pain and anxiety easily" and that euphoria or euphoric, if adopted, "would give greater precision to language in speaking of the primary and common effect of alcohol, opium, Using statistical data compiled by several physicians in India, Roberts concluded that, in India, opium consumption was a habit of men rather than women, and middle -aged and older persons rather than children or young adults. 63 Daily dosages varied from the one-fifth of users who kept to a low of 2 to 5 grains of opium to the one-tenth who exceeded 40 grains a day-a few by a great deal more than that. Daily consumption tended to be heavier in the Rajput states where opium was cheap and abundant, and considerably lighter in Orissa where it was more expensive. Once begun, opium was "usually a life-long habit" with a dose taken twice a day, usually morning and evening. Beginning users initially increased their dosage levels until they reached "the level of individual tolerance" and often kept the same dosage for life or varied it around this level.
When a habitual user did not obtain his daily dosage, he displayed well-known symptoms of exhaustion and dullness. His eyes and nose began to run, he yawned, he suffered abdominal pains and lost his appetite. As soon as he ingested the normal dosage all symptoms vanished.
When however, circumstances abruptly cut off habitual user's daily dosage, his sufferin g was considerably greater than that of those deprived similarly of alcohol or tobacco. Medical officers in charge of Indian jails testified to the misery of newly jailed inmates deprived of their usual opium pills. Severe symptoms lasting a few days to as much as two weeks included "looseness of the bowels, dejection and misery, restlessness and loss of sleep, failure of appetite, aching of the bones, lassitude and misery". 64 Most prisoners recovered their health without incident, but some who were suffering from dysentery at the time or some other disease might have to have opium dosages given them at lowered levels to prevent collapse or even death. Commission interviewed a number of witnesses who were professed long-term opium eaters who "could not be distinguished in any way from other persons of the same age and station in life.".
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Of the 215 long-term opium users reported on by Dr. Moy Roy at Calcutta, 76 were over sixty years of age and of these five were in their eighties. According to Dr. Moy Roy, their health was "equal in every respect to that of the average native not given to this habit".
However, when an opium eater consumed dosages higher than his maintenance level, he became "persistently indolent, stupid, and incapable of attending to his business, his appetite falls off, and he becomes lean and shriveled." The user to excess suffered from either unremitting constipation or alternating constipation and diarrhea. Beyond these symptoms, however, opium did not cause diseases and premature death, instead the user, barring other illnesses, could live out his natural life span. Fortunately, however such an "opium sot" was a "rare spectacle" in India.
68
Contradicting concerns that had been raised by anti-opium reformers, Roberts reported that medical officers in charge of lunatic asylums in India gave evidence that "the opium-habit is rarely if ever a cause of insanity". Neither did it encourage suicide as reformers charged. Taking an overdose of opium might be an appealing method of self-destruction in India as elsewhere, but official statistics revealed that, in fact, there was no relationship between intensity of opium usage and the numbers of suicides. Areas such as Assam which had the largest consumption of opium had the smallest level of suicides. Despite its undeserved popular reputation as an aphrodisiac, Although anti-opium reformers disputed the claim, most Indians believed that opium served to alleviate the sufferings of those afflicted with malaria and that it was an invaluable preventive against contracting the disease. Physicians testifying before the Commission were sharply divided on this issue. Here Roberts referred to trials that the Indian Medical Service had carried out in the 1850's to establish the efficacy of anarcotine (or narcotine) one of the principal alkaloids found in opium. These trials determined that opium equaled quinine in its capacity to arrest "the paroxysms of intermittent fever" associated with recurring malarial attacks, if given in sufficient quantities t o the sufferer. And, if opium were taken regularly, it helped prevent recurring attacks.
Unfortunately, obtaining these benefits required consumption of large dosages of opium.
Patna opium contained on average only 6.4% of anarcotine, which meant that for a dose of one grain of anarcotine, the patient would have to consume 16 grains of opium. Unless he or she was already a heavy opium eater, the patient could be poisoned by ingesting these large amounts.
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Still, moderate consumers of opium probably gained some protection against malarial fevers and some reduction of their severity if they occurred.
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To the opium reformers one of the most alarming and off-putting of Indian customs was that of routinely giving small dosages of opium daily to infants. Mothers put a tiny speck of opium into the child's mouth, rubbed it on their breasts for nursing infants, or in Bombay gave them pills containing one-sixth or one-third a grain of opium. Begun soon after birth, mothers continued to administer opium until ages two to three-at that point, the child completely stopped taking opium. In common with adult opium consumption, this habit was most prevalent in the northern and western regions of the subcontinent, and not so much found in the south and east.
Indian witnesses to the Commission testified "that the opium not only kept the children quiet and comfortable, but also helped them to digest their milk, that it prevented diarrhoea, warded off chills and fever, served to alleviate the troubles of dentitition, and generally helped to keep the children in good health". 73 The Commission heard evidence that accidental poisoning might occur, but that generally the children so afflicted recovered and fatalities were extremely rare. Testimony before the Commission established that opium smoking "generally looked down upon in India as a low and vicious habit" was not at all prevalent. Whether madak smoked in water pipes, or the more expensive and potent chandu smoked in specially made opium pipes, smoking opium was an urban habit engaged in by "the humbler grades of society" who frequented unsavory opium dens. 76 Whether opium smoking was any more harmful to the smoker's health than opium eating, was not at all certain. 77 Responding to Indian sentiment, the Government of India had recently prohibited any consumption of opium in public shops.
When examined in detail, Robert's summary and analysis is thorough, rigorous and persuasive. The memorandum portrays opium use in India in what appears to be a fair and reasonable description. His conclusions accurately reflect the mass of evidence printed in the report of the Royal Commission.
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Results from an unofficial inquiry agree in every point with the Roberts memorandum.
In its November 25 th , 1893 issue, the pro-opium The British Medical Journal summarized the Opium and the British Indian Empire Web Page views on opium of one hundred British physicians-some in government service, some in private employment-practicing medicine in India. 79 The previous July Ernest Hart, chairman of the Parliamentary Bills Committee of the British Medical Association, had sent a circular letter to colleagues in India asking them a series of questions about opium use in that society. The respondents agreed that opium use was widespread and generally moderate; that long-term users tended to find a tolerable dosage level and to maintain that without change; that moderate opium use rarely led to excessive consumption; and that its medical value to the population of India very great. However, the respondents split on the question of whether opium was an effective prophylactic against malaria. Virtually all, in answer to a direct question, replied that opium use did not harm either the physical or moral condition of the people of India. Again in reply to a question comparing the adverse effects of opium with alcohol, there was: "absolute unanimity" among the respondents. All firmly stated that the effects of alcohol were far worse than those of opium and all suggested that prohibiting opium's use would lead to a rise in alcohol consumption in India.
Medical opinion in Britain had little trouble accepting the testimony of British-Indian colleagues. It is true that by the early 1890's, medical use of opium was declining and some medical men were becoming reluctant to prescribe it. The most advanced medical practitioners increasingly substituted quinine, chloral and bromides for opium in the treatment of fever and sleeplessness. Nevertheless, for most physicians in general practice opium based medications remained a standby. British physicians, if they did not have an opium, or increasingly, a morphine habit themselves, knew that many of their patients from all classes did so. In their clinical observations they observed that continued opium use did not preclude living a productive and healthy life. 80 The conclusions drawn by the Royal Commission on Opium seemed perfectly reasonable.
The medical journal The Lancet, formerly supportive of the anti-opium movement, published an editorial in April 1895 that characterized the final report of the Royal Commission on Opium as a "crushing blow to the anti-opium faddists" that exposed their claims to have been "either ridiculously exaggerated or even altogether unfounded". To physicians familiar with the symptoms of both alcoholism and chronic opium consumption, this was a powerful image. For many Vic torian physicians faced with the lifethreatening behavior of the deeply addicted drinker, consumption of opium or morphine seemed benign. In fact, many physicians administered morphine on a maintenance basis as a strategy for ending alcoholism. They did not do this lightly, nor did they perceive opiate use to be innocuous, but reasoned that if a cure seemed impossible, the opiate habit was far preferable to alcoholism.
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Regulation and Control
British opium reformers had long assailed the Government of India for what they considered to be its disinterest in and inattention to limiting and ending the consumption of opium within the subcontinent. They were especially worried that the practice of opium smoking with is highly addictive qualities, if not vigorous ly discouraged, would overtake the Indian subcontinent as it had China. The reformers accused Indian officials of being far more interested in enhancing 82 Ibid. Similarly, in a long, 1893 letter to The Lancet, Dr. A. Crombie, Surgeon-Superintendent of the European General Hospital, Calcutta, denounced "the cirrhosed livers, the diseased kidneys, the dropsy, the fatty hearts, the arterial degenerations, the paralysis and insanity-and the misery, brutality and crime of alcohol" in England. A. Dr. Crombie, "Government and the Indian Opium Trade," The Lancet ( revenues obtained from the sale of excise opium than in restricting its use. They suggested that whatever pious statements might be made by the Viceroy and other high officials, the excise system itself rewarded local officials when they generated additional revenues from the opium excise, not the reverse. In other words, the same fiscal incentives that caused the Government of India to promote the export of opium to the Far East acted internally to promote consumption and sale within the subcontinent. Ultimately, of course, opium reformers demanded an end to the excise system altogether in favor of sales restricted to opium for medical purposes only.
These charges were inaccurate and unfair. Throughout the nineteenth century, since inception of the Bengal monopoly, the British rulers of India had grappled with the complex issues posed by their fiscal reliance on opium. By trial and error the regime devised consistentlyapplied principles, laws and regulations, and procedures capable of generating revenue and controlling the production, movement, and ultimate use of opium in India. After the 1857 Revolt, the rulers of India were unwilling to adopt policies that would offend Indian cultural sensibilities and lead to possible political unrest.
Admittedly, continuing public pressure applied by the anti-opium lobby at home forced the Indian Government to be more sensitive to restraining consumption that it might otherwise have been. Nevertheless, the end product of a century of what today would be called drug policy was an effective and even praiseworthy set of policies that were humanely executed. For opium, as for alcohol and cannabis (ganja), the Government of India avoided absolutist positions. It assumed that consumption of these substances would continue, that abstinence was a chimera and that the best the state could do would be to restrain these habits. The system that emerged in each major region of the subcontinent was sensitive to varying local conditions, cultural preferences and economic circumstances.
The Royal Commission's final report offered a detailed description of the Government of India's laws and administrative policies. Since passage of the Opium Act of 1878, the Government of India had assumed full authority to regulate the cultivation, manufacture, transport, import, export, sale, and possession of opium throughout British India. In place of older provincial regulations of varying stringency and irregular coverage, the 1878 statute made it illegal for anyone in British India to carry out any of these activities unless given explicit permission by the government. 84 The Act gave provincial governments authority to set local rules consistent with its provisions. It provided criminal penalties for violations of up to 1,000 rupee 84 Act I of 1878 passed by the Governor General of India in Council January 9, 1878. India had its own system of excise for regulation and sale of opium to domestic consumers. The broad features of these systems were similar: only persons who had paid for and obtained special licenses from the provincial government could sell opium in retail shops. The number of licenses and shops was fixed by the government for each city and district. Sales of licenses were usually for one year, although this could be extended. Under this farming system, licensees sometimes bid at auction; submitted written tenders, or simply paid a set fee for their monopoly rights.
Licensees sold either Bengal or Malwa opium. For the former, the state made supplies available at a set wholesale price; for the latter, licensees could purchase Malwa opium that had paid a stipulated pass fee of so much per pound of opium as an export from the native state where it was produced. In some areas, provincial governments set the retail price; in others it did not.
The provincial governments also set limits for a single sale to an individual and for any person to have in his or her possession at any time. These, relatively generous, limits, ranged between 300 to 900 grains of crude opium or 180 to 360 grains of smoking opium. Possession of larger amounts was ground for arrest. Any person could purchase opium at licensed shops in any amount up to the official limit for possession. There were rela tively few shops selling opium-a total of 10,118 for all of British India in 1893. Although densities varied by province, the overall average was one shop to just under 21,000 persons. Annual consumption of legally sold excise opium was just 27 grains per capita-about a week's supply for a moderate user.
92
The overall policy was one of "maximum revenue from minimum consumption".
Throughout British India, government policy kept the retail price of opium higher than that of an unregulated market. By adjusting the quantities of opium released, the wholesale price, and the number and distribution of shops the government aimed at a delicate balance between supply and demand. If the price were too high, quantities available inadequate and the numbers of shops too 91 Final Report, vol.5 Appendix XXVI, "Memorandum on the System of Opium Excise in the Hyderabad State", pp. 500-504. 9292 Final report, Enforcement of the opium statutes and rules followed a similar balanced approach. In every province excise, customs and police officials cooperated to discover, prosecute and punish those who illegally trafficked in opium. As the laws regulating opium were more clearly defined and expanded to cover more territory, so also did policing become more rigorous and effective.
However, senior officials never assumed that they could eliminate illicit traffic in opium.
Smuggling for example, was especially difficult to suppress in British districts that bordered on western Indian states producing Malwa opium for export. Instead, in each locality and province, the authorities tried to mobilize sufficient manpower and funds to deter trafficking and to reduce its intensity without resorting to heavy-handed, and expensive, policing that trampled on individual liberties. Government of India officers were acutely aware that the under-paid police were an imperfect instrument with considerable potential for extracting bribes and abusing the Indian populace and they did not want to incite political opposition by overly-zealous policing.
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Departmental yearly administrative reports supplied detailed data on prosecutions, tria ls, convictions, fines and rewards to informers. Opium officials tracked legal excise sales to calibrate the extent to which an illicit traffic was at work. When excise sales were far too low, they intensified their enforcement efforts through police patrols, informers and other tried and true methods. Relative to the size of the populations involved, prosecutions by provincial excise departments and the Opium Department were modest-less than ten thousand persons convicted in British India each year.
Within the confined territory of the Bihar and Benares Opium Agencies, where government-licensed cultivators produced "provision" or export opium, the Opium Department was primarily concerned to deter and punish the withholding of raw opium by cultivators for illegal sale. In 1893-94, the Department brought criminal prosecutions against 2,216 persons of 93 While one might argue that this apprehension partly rested on racist assumptions that Indians in subordinate official positions were prone to be corrupt and brutal, more often than not, Indian police behavior fulfilled these expectations. Opium and the British Indian Empire Web Page 
Conclusion
India was a colonized country, ruled by foreigners who since the mid-eighteenth century had forcibly imposed a foreign language, institutions and cultural practices upon her. The British opium reformers were assailing an aspect of Indian culture and society that Indians themselves did not view as especially harmful. Opium use for both medicinal and mood-altering purposes was an accepted cultural practice throughout the subcontinent with little or no disapproval 102 The tension between the central government and Burmese provincial officials is reflected in Opium and the British Indian Empire Web Page Clearly, the attack on Indian opium use was a form of cultural imperialism. The reformers unanimously regarded opium consumption (other than for the most direct medical purpose) as disgusting and degrading. This was a foreign judgment that had its roots in European or western culture and society. It was a judgment that, among many others, condemned the practices and customs of India and the Orient. It was also a judgment intimately tied to that version of Protestant Christianity practiced in the British Isles in the late nineteenth century and disseminated by missionaries in India. As their testimony to the Royal Commission on Opium revealed, British and American Protestant missionaries were the most fervent anti-opium witnesses.
The arguments of the opium reformers were, however, distinctly weakened by the pervasive use of alcohol in Britain and other western countries. Although most reformers were themselves abstainers and avid supporters of temperance, they came from a society that in Indian eyes was addicted to a drug far more dangerous and debilitating than opium. In Indian eyes alcohol was a western drug that the colonial relationship was forcing upon them. Both Muslims and high-caste Hindus condemned the use of alcohol. Nearly invariably, when confronted with the question, opium apologist, both British and Indian, drew an unfla ttering comparison between Indian use of opium and British consumption of alcohol. This was the thrust of Richard Temple's 1891 attack on the anti-opium resolution and reflected the views of nearly all British officials who had served in India. Most regarded the spread of western-style spirits or beer drinking among Indians with great concern.
The Commission in its final report ignored the opium-alcohol comparison. But in his appended statement to the final report Haridas Veharidas denounced the British anti-opium movement as "unfair" in that it attacked opium "before any attempt is made to relieve India from the effects of alcohol." He predicted that if opium were restricted, this would lead to greater use of alcohol, "which is admitted by all parties to be much more injurious and mischievous than opium, not to speak of its objectionable character in a majority of cases from a religious point of issue, at least, Lansdowne, Lyall, and other high officials involved championed the interests of the people of India against well-meaning interference. The Government of India was better attuned to Indian opinion than the opium reformers.
The Commission's hearings became an arena for a contest between the Government of India that sought to preserve the status quo and its anti-opium critics. The Government of India prevailed, not because of chicanery or force, but because its position was consistent with that of most of the people of India. The anti-opium reformers made culturally biased judgments and accusations that could not be supported. Ironically, the colonial government of India found itself resisting a virulent form of cultural imperialism from Britain.
